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DOD Strategic Religious Engagement:
A Luxury or a Necessity?
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man. narrative that takes the reader from the rage-filled city streets of Tehran to the windswept sands of the failed Desert One rescue site, Bowden makes a compelling case that Iran's revolution was not simply a localized power struggle in much grander chess match between the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, it was actually a religiously-fueled revolution that "tapped into a subterranean ocean of Islamic outrage." 2 The image of over sixty bound and blindfolded Americans left many in the United States feeling helpless and enraged, and simultaneously emboldened the Iranian populace with a new sense of strength and national purpose. 3 For many in America, the Islamic uprising was a shocking anomaly that caught the President and the top policy makers by surprise. However, this should not have been the case. 4 The religiously-driven events in Iran were certainly not un-signaled nor an aberration.
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Decades later, it is easier to see how mistakes made in identifying and understanding the intelligence on the cultural dynamics at work in the Middle East led to poor foreign policy decisions. It is particularly clearer now, at this period in the country's history, due to the international environment the United States finds itself in the 21 st Century. A detailed look at the 1979 hostage crisis suggests that intelligence analysts supporting the foreign policy decision-makers failed to properly place the political events in Iran in the context of the social and economic changes that were affecting the Middle East. Primarily, intelligence analysts failed to adequately weight the potential impact of the strong Shia religious influence affecting the country. 5 State Department reports at the time properly noted that the Ayatollah Khomeini had emerged as the most outspoken critic of the government and that the Islamic opponents were in a strong position to overthrow the Shah. However, evidence indicates that the combined biases of the U.S. intelligence community and a majority of foreign policy experts resulted in a catastrophic discounting of the significant role religion would play in the events that unfolded. 6 One of the world's top scholars on Iran, Dr. James A. Bill, goes further in his analysis of the intelligence mistakes made as events built-up to the Shah's overthrow.
In his book, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, Dr.
Bill, explains that "even non-specialists with only a generic interest in the region could hardly ignore the most salient feature of Iran's history: a unique repetition of its clashing
Islamic identities punctuated by outbreaks in religious fanaticism." 7 Given this historic knowledge, U.S. monitoring of Iranian politics should have always included the religious dimension to keep abreast of the attitudes and activities of the more prominent religious 3 leaders. 8 Dr. Bill identifies that a significant minority within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) struggled against an intellectual bias in the organization's culture, failing in their attempt to highlight the substantial role that religion was playing in fueling the turmoil and unrest building in Iran. Sadly, the organizational hierarchy was afflicted with an intellectual prejudice that summarily dismissed any discussion of religious influence prior to the revolution on the grounds that it was nothing but mere "sociology," a term typically used in intelligence circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant.
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According to Dr. Edward Luttwak, a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and one of the country's finest strategic thinkers, had U.S. analysis admitted that the revolt was motivated by an intense religious hatred for the westernization of the Middle East, the disastrous advice given to the Shah might have been different. 10 He also adds that the failure of the CIA to conduct or support a single research proposal relating to the religious dimensions of Iranian politics leading up to the revolution in 1979 was symptomatic of the "distortion caused by defining the struggle solely in terms of conventional western political and economic categories." 11 Unbeknownst to the U.S. political leadership at the time, this was only the first of many future encounters with militant religion. For decades this "symptomatic distortion"
effectively put blinders on the U.S. intelligence community while systematically shackling U.S. diplomatic efforts.
A Prejudice born of the Enlightenment
In order to effectively conduct foreign policy today, you have to understand the role of God and religion. My [Former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright's] sense is that we don't fully understand, because one, it's pretty complicated, and two, everyone in the U.S. believes in a separation of church and state, so you think, "Well, if we don't believe in the convergence of church and state, then perhaps we shouldn't worry about the role of religion." I think we do that now at our own peril. 12 The willingness of U.S. national leadership to quickly dismiss the religiouslymotivated ground swell in the Middle East is not surprising. Much academic scholarship since the mid-1990's points to an intellectual blind spot in the intelligence and diplomatic community that is a natural outgrowth of an academic bias that has infiltrated the universities of America and shaped generations of the United States' finest thinkers and leaders. Until recently, a thoroughgoing secular mindset has dominated the study of international relations, viewing religion as an irrelevant and declining force in modern life. Unfortunately, this perspective has had unfavorable results for Western diplomacy.
Dr. Luttwak perceptively points out that the widespread refusal to extend recognition to the entire religious dimension of politics has little to do with one's personal attitudes toward religion. In fact, many who quickly discount the role of religious discourse as a positive shaping tool in international diplomacy actually have deep, personal religious views. 13 Instead, he suggests that the religious prejudice is a "learned repugnance" to deliberately discount any intellectual acknowledgement of overt manifestations of serious religious sentiment. 14 He is not alone in his observations.
Over the past three decades, a growing body of scholarly work has exposed the root causes of the United States' inability to understand the significance of religion as a central motivator for human action. The seminal book in this area is Religion, the One of the consistent themes of Dr. Johnston's work is that, due to the degree to which they separate their spiritual lives from their public lives, Americans now face an immense difficulty in comprehending the depths to which religious and political considerations interact in shaping the perceptions and motivations of individuals from other societies. 15 For the same reason, American do not fully appreciate the possibilities that exist when the parties involved in a conflict can be appealed to on the basis of shared spiritual convictions or values. 16 Washington political theorist Stanton
Burnett perceptively generalized the predicament by stating, "American diplomats, raised in the Enlightenment secularism of the Realist school, are unprepared to see spiritual aspects of problems and possible solutions to many of the difficulties with whom they dealt abroad." 17 
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Separation not Elimination
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
18
To fully grasp the deeply-rooted, secular bias ingrained in the practitioners of United States' foreign policy one has to consider the so-called "separation of church and state doctrine" embodied in the Bill of Rights, which in effect can contribute to suppressing consideration of religious factors as explanations for and possible solutions to human conflict. Freedom of religion is a central principle of democracy in the United
States, and is enshrined in the First Amendment to the Constitution along with other fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. The
Founding Fathers treated religion and religious belief differently from other forms of expression to ensure protection of religious freedom. The origins of the secularism expressed in the First Amendment is primarily a Christian phenomenon that traces back to the struggles between Protestants and Catholics, which devastated Christian Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was the ferocity of these struggles and the desire to deprive religious institutions of coercive power that finally drove Christian theologians to develop a doctrine of the separation of the church and state. 19 The way this central principle of the United States has developed over the course of the nation's history has created a social stigma that suppresses religious discussion to the extent that there is effectively a prejudice against it in public or political discourse.
Unfortunately, this has aided in fostering an intellectual disconnect from much of the world, where religion is a fundamental element in their thinking and political discourse. 24 In the uncertainty that followed, academics and foreign policy experts scrambled to define the features of the "new world disorder."
Arguably the most famous scholar to examine and characterize the era of post- 28 Evolving Environment
Since the terror attacks of 9/11, I [Madeline Albright] have come to realize that it may have been I who was stuck in an earlier time. Like many other foreign policy professionals, I have had to adjust the lens through which I view the world, comprehending something that seemed to be a new reality, but that had actually had been evident for some time. The 1990s had been a decade of globalization and spectacular technological gains; the information revolution altered our lifestyle, transformed the workplace, and fostered the development of a whole new vocabulary. There was another driving force at work. Almost everywhere religious movements are thriving. 29 In the swiftly evolving and chaotic international environment, the inability of the United States government to sufficiently integrate credible, strategic religious engagement into its diplomatic tool kit will damage its foreign policy efforts and possibly endanger the security of the nation. Almost anywhere one turns, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Indonesia, Nigeria, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sudan, Sri Lanka, one finds a religious dimension to hostilities. 30 According to Dr. Douglas Johnston, "an inability to see, understand, and make common cause with religious/spiritual forces will involve even higher costs in the future because many imminent conflicts, both international and within states, will have religion as the defining characteristic of at least one of the contending communities." 33 Whether it is the root cause of a conflict, or merely a mobilizing vehicle for nationalist and ethnic passions, religion possesses an unrivaled potential to cause instability at all levels of the global system and the character of these conflicts will be misunderstood if religion is not accurately taken into account.
34
The imperative for U.S. diplomacy is to consciously widen its vision to include the influence of religious convictions. 35 However, if the secularist habits of thought pervasive within the United States foreign policy community continue to dominate its analysis and engagement to the utter exclusion of considerations of religious influences, the United States will put itself in perilous territory. 36 Smart Power
If I [Madeline Albright] were Secretary of State today, I would not seek to mediate disputes on the basis of religious principles any more that I would try to negotiate alone the more intricate details of a trade agreement or a pact on arms control. In each case, I would ask people more expert than I to begin the process of identifying key issues, exploring the possibilities, and suggesting a course of action. 37 For decades, one of the greatest threats to the United States survival was the Soviet Union's nuclear capability. Arguably, the most concerning was the threat posed by their Typhoon-class, ballistic missile submarines. As part of the nuclear triad, consisting of strategic bombers, inter-continental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, these vessels were engineered to stay at sea, virtually undetected, for long periods of time. This capability allowed the submarines a greater chance of survival from a potential first strike and afforded the Soviet's a credible second-strike capacity. Additionally, the ability of these submarines to silently deploy off the coast of the United States, within a very short striking range of strategic targets, only exasperated the tension between the super-powers at the height of the Cold-War. To counter this threat, the United States Navy developed sophisticated shore-based, aircraft-based, and surface-based sensors and weapons to detect and aid in destroying these lurking monsters. However, it was common knowledge in the anti-submarine warfare community that the preferred way to detect and destroy a ballistic submarine was with another submarine. This required the development, construction and deployment of the highly advanced Los Angeles Class attack submarines. The Los Angeles attack submarines did not eliminate the need for all the other ASW platforms.
In fact, the United States Navy became extremely adept at using all of their sensor platforms in a highly coordinated effort to track and prosecute Soviet submarines. In a similar manner, the recommendation here is to continue to embrace and integrate all "platforms" of national power when engaging in world-wide diplomatic efforts. With an understanding that normal containment methods, defensive mechanisms, and hard/soft power combinations often used in the rational actor scenario do not often work well in the religious dimension. Much like using an attack sub to counter a ballistic sub, United
States diplomacy needs to embrace strategic religious engagement as an essential tool to inform, persuade, influence and shape human terrain with comparable religious thoughts.
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The call for an intentional, strategic religious engagement is not a move to shift to soft power alone. It is rather a proposal to set aside years of secular bias and excision of religious considerations from analysis, thought and discourse and integrate a line of effort into the national strategy that applies deliberate religious dialogue as a method of conflict prevention and mediation. In countering religious-based extremist ideologies, the United States should not yield its entire repertoire of both hard and soft power.
Traditionally, United States hard power enabled its diplomats to also wield soft power to get what was in the best interest of the country. The military has been the primary source of United States hard power and while they are well suited to defeating traditional states, typically they have been a poor instrument to fight ideas. 38 As the recently published, CSIS Commission on Smart Power states, "soft power is the ability to influence and attract people to the United States' position without coercion and is an essential element in winning the peace and helping others build capable, democratic states. Appealing to others' values, interests, and cultural references can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. It is certainly easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic." 39 Ultimately, smart power, which is a skillful combination of both hard and soft power, is the desired combination needed in United States foreign policy. Smart power is term often attributed to Dr. Joseph Nye, a Harvard Professor and political scientist.
According to Dr. Nye, smart power "involves weaving both hard and soft power into an integrated strategy, resource base and took kit to achieve American political objectives.
It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American 47 In light of the dynamic, globalized world, the U.S. diplomatic efforts will need to be more innovative and take more risks. Sustained, strategic religious engagement is an intentional attempt to remove bias, understand cultural perspective and ultimately influence and shape behavior. For strategic religious engagement to be effective it has to be deliberate and patient. Since the goal is to find common ground, build trust, and drain the swamp of religious extremist behavior, there has an appreciation for the time to have effects on a populace. By creating unifying guidance for engagement with religious principles, increasing religion-related knowledge, and integrating intentional, religious engagement at all levels of foreign diplomacy, the United States government can avoid repeating past mistakes and increase its effectiveness in conflict-prone settings. 48 As difficult as this effort may be it, a strategic concept for synchronizing the government's action and words in this arena is not a novel concept. There are entities within the whole of government that have been attempting to engage in the religious dimension for several years. Unfortunately, the effort has largely been uncoordinated and ignored due to an overt institutional prejudice of interweaving government and religion. In light of religiously-influenced events that range from the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, to the attacks on 9/11, and to the recent 2012 global eruption over the "Innocence of the Muslim" YouTube video, maintaining a national approach that is void of intentional, strategic religious engagement is irresponsible and dangerous.
Developing a capacity for spiritual engagement will not be as easy. There is tremendous inertia within the government establishment to overcome. However, intentional, sustained strategic religious engagement has an opportunity for incredible impact at little cost.
Whole of Government Approach
When I [Madeline Albright] was secretary of state, I had an entire bureau of economic experts I could turn to, and a cadre of experts on nonproliferation and arms control whose mastery of technical jargon earned them a nickname, "the priesthood." With the notable exception of Ambassador Seiple, I did not have a similar expertise available for integrating religious principles into our efforts at diplomacy. Given the nature of today's world, knowledge of this type is essential. connected to information about the United States and the world than ever before through new and expanding global communications media. 51 Unfortunately, due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, any words that President Bush and the U.S. diplomatic community spoke to the Muslim world often came off as patronizing or phony.
U.S. Government Bureaucratic Reform
Organized religion makes up the largest part of civil society around the world. Nearly 85 percent of people worldwide participate in a faith tradition. We need to engage with religious communities in order to have a holistic understanding of the factors at play in any given country. 52 Recent events in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria highlight the urgency of formulating U.S. foreign policy that takes account of the motivations of religious actors. Undoubtedly, there is some growing awareness in the Government that religious engagement is a critical element in employing smart power in trying to achieve U.S.
policy aims. However, as important as current government efforts have been, diplomats and other representatives are ill-prepared for engaging religious leaders, institutions, and publics around the globe. 56 In general, most diplomats receive minimal mandatory training in the necessary religious literacy and competency required to fully navigate their challenging assignments. This lack of education, combined with the aforementioned intellectual prejudice against engaging in religious discourse in the discharge of official duties, means that the nation is sending its officials out into a very religious world without the tools necessary to operate effectively. 57 The lack of training combined with the confusion about limits and permissions for strategic religious engagement have effectively neutralized the ability of the U.S. officials to advance policy in the often tense, international religious terrain.
If the United States is to earnestly engage the religious dimension of the human realm of then there must be a concerted effort to organize and resource an effort for intentional, strategic religious engagement. A systematic restructuring of its current engagement tools must support a revolutionary new mindset. Suggestions on exactly how to implement this restructuring vary from the radical to the simple and include such Command (GCC). In fact, this is the one element of national power, with a few deliberate tweaks of its ongoing strategic operations, which can immediately have a significant impact on these tense, international religious fault lines.
We Can't Kill Our Way to Victory
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither taking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. 60 Of all the elements in the national power, the Department of Defense is best poised to immediately integrate religious engagement into its current world-wide strategic planning and shaping efforts. The intent here is not to dissect the roles and responsibilities of the various government departments and examine if DOD should continue to take such a pronounced role in helping to "shape" or "operationalize" U.S.
foreign policy. 61 The reality is that contemporary armed conflict includes a pronounced erosion of the boundaries between the military and political domains and given the 21 economic constraints facing the United States a complete restructuring and substantial resourcing of the Department of State is highly unlikely. Meanwhile, preventing conflict, regional instability and humanitarian disaster is not an inconvenient luxury, but an immediate necessity. 62 In the current economic environment, with an increased pressure to counter non-state actors and terrorists, the blurred lines between the roles of DOD in shaping operations is of significantly less of importance than actually integrating religious engagement into specific strategic lines of effort that may resolve tensions, save money, and prevent further military commitments.
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Much like the Department of State, the primary responsibility of DOD is to protect and defend U.S. interests at home and abroad. Specifically, the National Command Authority charges each Geographical Combatant Commander (CCDR) with detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against the United States. In an effort to support the national security strategy, the Department of Defense requires GCCs to develop contingency and crisis action plans to respond to a vast array of security threats. In order to execute its assigned mission, each GCC will ordinarily concentrate on strengthening the defense capabilities of the nations, states, and regional organizations in their assigned theater; conducting military operations in order to deter and defeat trans-national threats; and providing a forward presence to promote regional stability and security. In response to the attacks on 9/11, Congress granted DOD the expanded authority to initiate a number of security assistance and development programs around the world. The Chaplaincy, A Game Changer
In the future, no American ambassador should be assigned to a country where religious feelings are strong unless he or she has a deep understanding of the faiths commonly practiced there. Ambassadors and their representatives, wherever they are assigned, should establish relationships with local religious leaders. medical care teams to underdeveloped areas, refurbishing hospitals and schools, and participating in construction projects to include digging wells and irrigation canals. 73 The unique ability of the GCC to plan for an entire area of operations, unlike a Department of State country team's singular focus on their individual country, allows the GCC a much broader platform from which to craft smart, integrated engagement. 74 Conversely, the ambassador's country team's narrow focus is essential to properly shape and contain the military's over-eager desires to run amok and do more harm than good. The need to integrate diplomacy and defense is vital in current armed conflict. If anything the past few decades of war should have highlighted is that it is extremely difficult to try and build relationships, both within the government and with other countries, after a crisis has started.
For the military to support a long-rage, strategic view of religious engagement it needs to grow its current methodology. Presently, its religious engagement focuses on integrating the capability into ongoing crisis and stability operations at the operational and tactical levels. To create a broader strategy to shape the AOR, the Geographical Combatant Comand needs to craft a bolder engagement plan that tailors an intentional, long-range, religious strategy to match the religious cultural dynamic of its region.
Realistically, this does not require a leap into the unknown. With a few minor tweaks to the currently established Theater Security Cooperation plans, each GCC has the tools to begin shaping the religious environment of their respective AORs immediately. As the religious components of conflicts continue to rise in importance and economic realities constrain the U.S. Government, GCC strategic religious engagement can provide an innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach to assist in accomplishing its regional objectives in support of the National Security Strategy. 75 Integration and Implementation Few U.S. officials know enough about Islamic law and theology, or about Muslim-world history and culture to debate relevant issues. As a result they are rarely persuasive on questions that shape Arab and Muslim political opinion. 76 One of the fundamental principles in Phase Zero shaping is the need to build strong relationships that contribute to the mutual desires for regional peace and stability.
If the GCC develops a strategic capacity for religious engagement specifically tailored to its Area of Responsibility, there is an increased probability that personal relationships
and shared values can reduce some of the tension resulting from the religious fault lines across the globe. For years, members of the defense and diplomacy communities understood that the cross-cultural training of leaders naturally enhanced relations between the U.S. and foreign countries. This principle is the reason that the Department of Defense invests heavily in Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and the Department of State exerts effort in sponsoring foreign exchange programs. In introducing strategic religious engagement into the GCC's Theater Campaign Plan it is essential that diplomacy and defense mutually support each other in order to forge strong international partnerships and meet the shared regional security challenges. At this time, the GCC is well prepared to embark on religious engagement: it has the relationships with the embassies, militaries, and other external agencies; it is very familiar with the specific cultural dynamics of the region; it has created Theater Security
Cooperation plans that call for repetitive engagement to shape the regional landscape; it has unique capability with the organic chaplaincy to build trust across religious lines; 27 and ultimately it is charged with conducting operations to defending the homeland.
With this in mind, in order to properly integrate strategic religious engagement into the Geographical Commander's TSC plan the following five steps provide a roadmap for consideration.
Step 1 Plans. 83 As the GCCs grapple with integrating the religious dimension into its sphere of influence, it is important to leverage those organizations outside the government that are focused on the positive aspects of religion as a bridge-builder in conflict resolution to aid in the training and education of the staffs seeking to shape and influence regional AORs.
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Step 2. Map the Cultural Terrain
Religious engagement is primarily an intelligence battle and any future success will hinge on the ability of creating specially crafted engagement teams to coordinate and partner with key religious leadership in the affected countries. proper intelligence strategy will specifically target "key influencers" whose views can have a ripple effect throughout society. 85 In particular, the requirement is to carefully identify the passionate voices in the AOR that incite populations to violence and elicit support the religious personalities that condemn extremist behavior. portions of theater plans, orders, and directives; and developing and recommending strategic command policy regarding religious issues. 87 It is imperative that each JFCH is personally involved in the integration of religious engagement in theater plans.
Unfortunately, even though DOD repeatedly sends senior chaplains to Senior Service Colleges, seldom are the used as planners in GCCs crafting of strategic plans. This is primarily due to inability of the chaplaincy to break from their traditional commandfocused, spiritual role. As the chaplaincy is challenged to grow into an integrated, strategic thinker and planner, the relationships of trust that they establish and develop by networking with local religious leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations, international organizations, and the interagency community will contribute significantly to the enhanced situational awareness of the cultural terrain of an AOR and aid in developing strategies to deter conflict.
Step 3: Form the Engagement Strategy:
Once the GCC ascertains the influential religious actors in a region, the next step
is to determine what it considers as acceptable behavior and identify the available methods of persuasion to engage, inform, and influence those whose views can have a positive or negative ripple effect throughout society. The noted weakness of religious engagement across the whole of government is that while the U.S. has made great strides in developing sophisticated engagement strategies for religious actors, the missing ingredient is a systematic and regular forum for consultation with interfaith groups and religious leaders. 88 With this in mind, any strategic religious engagement plan will be a combination of gaining situational awareness, strategic communications, and repetitive face-to-face meetings. According to Joint Doctrine, "strategic communication" refers to focused efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S.
interests, policies, and objectives. 89 DOD strategic communications is a nested process within the U.S. government and it is a critical component of informing and influencing behavior in support of the "shape and deter" mission of a Geographical Combatant The goal of this activity is to alleviate mistrust, rumor, and stereo-types, and build influential partners that can serve as voices for good governance, human rights, justice, and religious freedom. 91 One strategic approach to GCC religious engagement would be to simply duplicate this conference of chaplains according to GCC regions. This would serve as bridge-building opportunity to identify lines of mutual religious commonality between established partnership countries. Once the vision of the conferences catches, the next step would be to take the conferences down into the individual countries and grow the ecumenical spiritual connections between different tribal and religious groups, all of which play a role in supporting and enhancing regional stability and security. In order to create synergy, repetitive spiritual engagement should synchronize with the ongoing TSC regional exercises already in place. Once in country, conferences led by trained Religious Engagement Teams (RET) would host dialog with moral and religious leaders such as clerics, imams, rabbis, monks, and priests in order to remove bias, understand cultural perspectives, and influence behavior in an effort to support U.S. national objectives in the region. Finally, in crafting a regional strategy, there needs to be an appreciation for the time necessary to have effects on a populace. Trying to change minds in the world-wide struggle for strategic influence takes patience.
Step 4: Build the Capability:
To execute repetitive, strategic religious engagement, each GCC needs to build the capability to deploy Religious Engagement Teams. These teams would be In rare instances, they will use that initial peacekeeping training in tactical and operational level peace and stability operations. The initial training they received in basic chaplain school will need to be refreshed at a later date and specifically tailored to the particular Geographical Combatant Command's strategic RET mission.
In developing RET personnel, each Combatant Command will want to select senior chaplains and capitalize on their years of religious and military experience. With the recently-established Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center (AFCC), the ability to craft a common, graduate-level, short-course in strategic religious diplomacy is fairly simple.
The AFCC can easily develop the curriculum by partnering with the likes of the ICRD, IGE, the Berkley Center and the Pew Forum. As stated before, each of these organizations have experience in partnering with DOD and DoS in religious diplomacy.
In fact, IGE and ICRD assisted in developing the initial peacekeeping and diplomacy curriculum with the chaplain schools of the Navy, Air Force, and Army. Likewise, the Pew Forum and Berkley Center have persistently worked with Combatant Commands in various type of religious education.
Step 5: Execute, Evaluate, Repeat
Once the GCCs initiate their strategic religious engagement program there will be a requirement to develop feedback and growth mechanisms. As regional situations change, the intelligence coming from the program will shape the message, the characteristics of those representing the GCC, and the battle rhythm of engagements.
Similarly, the relationships of the RETs to the Department of State and various interagency country teams will enable to programs to grow and adapt to the specific environments. Each GCC will need to be flexible enough to adjust the engagement parameters to have the greatest results and patient enough to allow the desired effects to take root. Finally, with the knowledge gained by integrating sustained religious engagement there will naturally be an increased desire to dedicate academic thought to the programs. Again, partnering with the outside agencies, to include the Senior Service Colleges, will allow the GCCs to draw some of the top academic minds in the U.S. toward the mutual desire to reduce conflict through relationships built upon religious diplomatic dialogue.
Luxury or Necessity:
No single speech can eradicate years of mistrust, nor can I [President Barack Obama] answer in the time that I have all the complex questions that brought us to this point. But I am convinced that in order to move forward, we must say openly to each other the things we hold in our hearts and that too often are said only behind closed doors. There must be a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground. 92 In a season of declining resources, the U.S. Government will soon begin to take a substantial risk in its military and economic elements of power, hoping that a bolstering of its diplomatic and informational elements will suffice in countering threats to the security of the nation. Evidence clearly indicates that the world is not growing more stable and religious beliefs as an element of worldwide, cultural conflict are increasing. At the same time, there is a rising appreciation for the powerful opportunities religious engagement can provide in supplementing other elements of national power. It is the premise of this paper that strategic religious engagement is not a luxury the U.S. can afford to ignore. Instead, it is a critical, but often neglected, component of U.S. foreign policy that, if properly integrated into strategic lines of effort, has great potential to shape and deter conflict.
If the ultimate mission of the military is to prevent war, then when the United
States sends its men and women forward into combat, the military in many respects has failed. Strategic religious engagement is not a sideshow to hard power, or a simple, diplomatic "nice to have." Influence requires legitimacy and it reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the host nation, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission. 93 Strategic religious engagement aims to establish legitimacy and effect behavioral change through the appeal of a shared, common system of beliefs. If religious engagement has the potential to produce a vastly superior output to the minimal required input, the question is now how best to integrate it as strategic line of effort. The hesitancy of most military strategists would be to shy away from formally adopting any religious engagement in GCC Phase Zero operations, not because they think it is unimportant, but because they are generally uncomfortable in dealing with religion due to systemic fear and personal bias. If the last decade of humanitarian and combat operations has taught the U.S.
military anything is that it has a proven capability to pragmatically integrate religious engagement into a full spectrum of operations. In order to build trust, marginalize worldwide religious extremism, and keep minor friction points from exploding into major issues, it is time that the Geographical Combatant Commands systematically integrate religious engagement into their Theater Strategy Plans. As much as engagement costs, it is far less than operations in Phase Three and Four. As Sun Tzu describes the
